Democracy is about the consensus on the alternatives. Forging the consensus makes politics worth pursuing. In other words, power feels itself safe and “acknowledged” if it enjoys support. The energy of trust received through the “voting machines” realizes itself in policies arrayed to sustain and, if possible, to promote vision (the so-called mandate). The undeniable strength of democracy and of its continuity is the peaceful and civilized transfer of power for a prescribed period of time thus facilitating its movement. The impetus destroys stagnation and the tension being a paramount ingredient for progress is better not be ruptured. There is no such thing as an “Arian” i.e. purified energy one can get from the people; it is always a mixed signal, deciphering of which makes the leader conscious to the extent he or she is prepared to do so. To put it in plain words, the trust of people is always more a burden than an award.
Calculated outcomes cannot encompass the richness of diversity but can tip the majority balance. That is why the options pursued, usually oscillate in-between the generalized priorities (for example, the quest for a safer international security environment) and practical feasibility (adapting the national missile defense plan to “accommodate” limited threats). The priorities are transferable, and thus “ride-able”. The technicalities are bureaucratic and thus, hardly surmountable. The ability of the leader to prop up the priority with the action is the benchmark in terms of skills and creativity.
One cannot deny the overall enormous progress the democracy has made through the history. And bloody it was. The twentieth century’s contribution in terms of nuclear energy is and will remain as unique but “transferable” starting point: From now on, each power transaction carries a nuclear element. It might be considered a technical attribute. As for the United States, nowadays, numerically, this proper element consists of 103 nuclear power plants and 3,500 nuclear warheads by the year of 2007 according to START II agreement. Worldwide, while there is a tendency to downsize the existing stockpile, there’s also a strong indication that the value of the nuclear composition will remain constant. The trend is toward the upgrading the facilities, rather than investing in alternative few options.
In a way, every vote during the election of the president carries a subliminal confirmation of “permission” to unleash retaliation capable of annihilating the entire habitat of the adversary. This is when the price of trust equals the value of life. The responsibility rests upon reasonable behavior within the limits of “trigger-happiness”. So far it works.
Nuclear deterrence has become a stagnant stalemate freezing the international status quo. It lacks the flexibility of options and leads to a programmed doomsday. Every next leader inherits the nuclear mindset per se if not for granted. Nuclear strategy got a stamp, as being non-derivative and human thought culminated at the point of mutual assured destruction. Being constant qualified for relative [in] stability. Being nuclear qualifies for exclusive treatment. But stability is a “live equilibrium.” Technological progress opens up prospects for additional opportunities. To support checks and balances of nuclear management countries turned to exploring the defensive capabilities beyond the risk of being exposed to the first strike. The challenge is to back up the deterrence rather than to withdraw: Limited neutralization ought to disrupt and stabilize the momentum. Accordingly, the deployment of transparent defenses might downgrade the value of nuclear balancing. This could affect the transfer of power in a sense that the option of preemptive defense is no less democratic than that of the annihilation.
The concept of nuclear deterrence has marked the cul-de-sac point in the relationship existed between the two opposite force “structures”. It cannot be a mode of conduct between the democratic nations: Democracy cannot retaliate with annihilation against the other democracy. Tastes differ while one is alive. Scaling down within the START agreements necessarily involves the theoretical amendments to reflect the process. Meanwhile, even when going down to as low as I, 500 warheads, both sides still find consolation that the nuclear deterrence remains intact. This just conforms to the mind setting.
2010
